1568/1068.

A DISCOURSE

Upon the Present Number of

FORCES,

IN

Great-Britain and *Ireland.*

Sed illos
Defendit numerus, junctæq; umbone phalanges.

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A

DISCOURSE

Upon the preſent Number of

LAND FORCES.

WHOEVER gives himſelf the Trouble to enquire how our Neighbour-Nations, that once were Free, came to be reduc'd to their preſent State of Slavery, will find, That STANDING ARMIES have been the Principal, if not the only Cauſe of it.

THIS is apparent to thoſe, who have any Knowledge of the Hiſtory of *Europe*,

 theſe

theſe two laſt Centuries: And that *England* has preſerv'd its Liberty ſo long, can be attributed to nothing ſo much, as to the Senſe they have ever had, of the Danger of keeping an Army in Times of Peace.

THE Indifference, indeed, with which MEN, at Preſent, look upon this Great and Threatning Evil, is ſomewhat incredible, and would induce one to believe, That this Truth was either never known, or at leaſt, forgot by them: That no Kingdom in *Europe* has been enſlav'd, but by an Army, or that Slavery is no where continued without one. This Unconcernedneſs, or rather, Compliance in a Matter of ſo very Great Conſequence, looks, as if that Zeal and Publick Spirit, which has ſo often, and ſo eminently appear'd in this Country in Defence of Liberty, is at laſt quite loſt. How elſe could Men, without Indignation hear ſuch abſurd Propoſitions advanc'd, as, That a Standing Army is neceſſary for the Preſervation of our Conſtitution, and that Eighteen or Twenty Thouſand Soldiers are no more than ſufficient for the Defence of it. Such Doctrines as theſe, ſuppoſe the Bulk of the Nation to be Enemies to our Conſtitution, to be bent upon their own Deſtruction, and to be kept againſt their Will from deſtroying them-

themſelves, by theſe careful and tender Guardians of their Liberty, the Army: What a fine Idea is here given us of the Government, as if, beſides its own intrinſick Strength, it wanted a powerful Army to ſupport it, and of our Conſtitution, as if it needed Dragoons for its Protectors? I defy the greateſt Advocate for a Standing Army, to ſhew any probable Ground of believing, that there is ſuch a Diſaffection, as to make this preſent Number of Forces neceſſary; or that there is any occaſion for their being greater now, than there was, after the Treaties of *Ryſwick* or *Utrecht*. Liberty and an Army are inconſiſtent, and there are few Inſtances, where Liberty has continu'd long in any Country, after the Eſtabliſhing of an Army. They who would protect their Rights and Liberties by an Army, juſt act as wiſely, as he, who would take a Lion into his Houſe to defend it againſt Thieves.

But how well grounded this Pretence of Diſaffection is, I ſhall have occaſion to enquire in the following part of this Diſcourſe. In the mean time, I ſhall give ſome Account of the Riſe and Growth of *Standing Armies* in this Country.

The first of this kind that we find, was that raised by the memorable *Forty One* Parliament against King *Charles* the First, who after they had murdered their Lawful Sovereign, turned their supposed Masters, the Commons, by whose Authority they were raised, ignominiously out of their House; and their General, *Oliver Cromwell*, by their Assistance, became more absolute, and did more arbitrary and illegal Actions, than any King of *England* ever had done.

THIS Example of keeping regular Forces in Times of Peace, has been ever since follow'd with no small Care: For tho after the Restoration, the Number of Men employ'd by King *Charles* for his Guards, was so small, as to give no Jealousy or Uneasyness, and were therefore connived at by the Parliament; yet by Degrees they were so much encreas'd, that in the Year Sixty seven, they amounted to near Six Thousand: This gave great Umbrage to the then House of Commons, who declared against them, as dangerous to the Freedom of the Nation, and vigorously insisted upon having them disbanded; which, however, they were never able to effect. The Conduct of that House of Commons, with Relation to the Army, is the more remarkable

able, because they were look'd upon to have gone as great Lengths with the Court, as any had done who preceded them.

In the succeeding Reign of King *James*, the Army was encreas'd, by the Duke of *Monmouth*'s Invasion, to about fifteen Thousand, no part of which, that unhappy Prince could ever be brought to part with; and his Confidence in his Troops, and neglect of such Measures, as would have made an Army needless, brought upon him those Misfortunes, which did not end but in the Ruin of Him and his Posterity.

After the Peace at *Ryswick*, King *William* in his Speech to the Parliament, tells them; That the Circumstances of Affairs Abroad were such, that he thought himself obliged to tell them his Opinion, that for that Time, *England* could not be safe without a Land Force, and hoped, that they would not give those, who design'd them ill, the opportunity of effecting that under the Notion of a Peace, which they could not bring to pass by a War; This apparent Inclination and Design in the King, gave a general Uneasiness and Jealousy to the House of Commons, and they were not a little surpriz'd at the Expression, that England could not be

safe

ſafe without a Land Force; by which, they underſtood that odious Thing, a Standing Army: Whereupon, taking his Majeſty's Speech into their Conſideration, they reſolv'd, That the Land Forces of this Kingdom, rais'd ſince the latter end of the Reign of King *Charles* the Second, ſhould be pay'd off and disbanded; and in a few Days after, appointed ſome Members to bring in a Bill to regulate the Militia, and make it more uſeful: But neither of theſe Things were done in that Parliament, of which, this was the laſt Seſſion, His Majeſty having got it put off for that Time, hoping, no Doubt, that the new Parliament which he intended ſhould meet the following Winter, would prove more favourable to his Wiſhes: But that Prince ſoon found he had deceiv'd himſelf. For notwithſtanding the Dependents, and Penſioners of the Court, uſed the ſame Endeavours and Arguments in this, which they had done in the former Parliament, and tho' the King in his Speech to them, plainly ſhow'd that his Deſire was to have the Army continued; yet, the Commons readily agreed, That the keeping ſuch a Standing Army in Time of Peace, was uſeleſs and burthenſome, and dangerous to the Freedom of the Nation; would be an ill Precedent to Futurity, and might encourage and enable a bad Prince to deſtroy the

Liberty

Liberty of the Subject; and accordingly voted, That all the Land Forces in *England*, exceeding Seven Thouſand, be forthwith paid off and disbanded. Upon this Reſolution, never enough to be commended, Orders were immediately given, to prepare, and bring in a Bill to that Purpoſe, which was done with a great deal of Diſpatch, and preſented to His Majeſty; who, not without ſome Reluctancy and great diſlike, expreſs'd at his being oblig'd to ſend away his *Dutch* Guards, to whom a Clauſe in this Act referr'd, gave his Aſſent to it.

I have ſeen what was material in the Arguments on both Sides; and it muſt indeed, be allow'd by all impartial Men, that the Members of that Houſe acted with great Honour to themſelves, and with great Regard to the Safety and Happineſs of the Nation: And I believe, any one, who with Sincerity and Attention conſiders the Reaſons which were then given for continuing that Army, will be of Opinion, that they were as weighty, and as plainly ſhew'd Neceſſities and Dangers, as any which have been ſince offered: But I don't find, that in their Debates they even dream't of thoſe laudable Arguments us'd in the late honeſt Houſe of Commons, of ever bleſſed Memory, That it was reaſonable to

agree

agree to the keeping of Sixteen or Seventeen Thouſand Men in Time of Peace, becauſe it was demanded by the Court, who is the beſt Judge of what is neceſſary for us; or, that to refuſe it, would argue a diſtruſt of his Majeſty.

BEFORE I leave this Head, I muſt obſerve, that ſuch was the Opinion of the Nation, at that Time, of continuing an Army of Eighteen or Twenty Thouſand Men, that King *William*'s attempting it, deſtroy'd a great Share of that Affection which he formerly held in the Minds of his People, and was in ſome Meaſure, the Cauſe that the ſucceeding Part of his Reign was ſo difficult and uneaſy to him.

UPON the Concluſion of the Peace at *Utrecht*, the then Adminiſtration reduc'd the Army in *Britain* to ten Thouſand, the Number they conſiſted before the War was enter'd upon. This highly offended the Gentlemen of that Profeſſion, and was the Reaſon, it may be, that ſome of them appear'd with ſo much Heat and Paſſion againſt thoſe at that Time in Power; Theſe Gentlemen of the Army, found that the then Miniſtry had not ſhewn themſelves ſo ready, as thoſe whom they ſucceeded, to carry on a War, which might

might have been ended many Years before, with as much Advantage to the Nation, as ever thoſe Managers deſigned or propos'd.

SOON after his preſent Majeſty's peaceable and happy Acceſſion to the Throne, three Regiments of Foot were rais'd, which afforded Matter of Speculation to thoſe who ſtood at a Diſtance, and were unacquainted with the Springs and Cauſes of thoſe Actions.

MUCH about the ſame Time, Impeachments were begun againſt moſt of the Queen's Chief Miniſters; ſome of whom, were as Eminent for their Quality, as they were High, in the Affections of the People. This Action, however juſtifiable and legal, was by no means Popular; and to it, the Friends of the Accuſed, and others, who bore no good Will to the Government, aſcrib'd that unadvis'd, ill-concerted Rebellion, which broke out in *Scotland*: But from that Affair, whatever the Cauſes of it were, and from the Scuffle at *Preſton*, which was the Conſequence of it, this Argument has been chiefly drawn: That there was ſuch a Diſaffection in the Nation, as to make it neceſſary to maintain a great Part of the Forces employ'd in the Suppreſſion of that Rebellion: This, I may venture to ſay, was the Occaſion of the Army's being

encreas'd from Ten, to about Fifteen Thouſand, as the late Plot was, of an Additional Number of Four Thouſand more.

GRANTING that the Rebellion was a Proof of a general Diſaffection in *Scotland*, which upon Examination will be found no ways juſt; yet this cannot at all be underſtood of *England*, for the Smallneſs of the Number of thoſe who join'd the Highlanders, who march'd into this Country, makes it apparent, that there was very little Diſaffection here: And there are few, who have any Knowledge of that Affair, but are ſenſible, that by far the leaſt, and moſt inconſiderable Part of *Scotland*, was engag'd in it. The whole Counties, on this Side the *Forth*, ſhew'd themſelves as zealous for his Majeſty's Service, as ever People did. Several of the moſt conſiderable of the Highland Clans, either ſtood neuter, or were engag'd againſt the Rebels; and the greateſt Part of the Common People, eſpecially in the Low-Land Countries, were, by their Superiors, moſt of whom are now attainted, much againſt their Inclination, forced into that Service: But if there's any one who doubts of the general good Affection of the People of *Scotland*, I deſire he may conſider, how firm to the preſent Intereſt thoſe from that Country, who ſerve in a Parli-

Parliamentary Capacity, have always been; and likewiſe, what a perfect good Underſtanding there has all along been, between his Majeſty and the Kirk, whoſe General Aſſembly, by His ſpecial Grace and Favour, every Year meet, and ſit for the Diſpacth of their Buſineſs: What an Influence thoſe godly Teachers have upon the Minds of the People, the Monarchy and Church of *England* has formerly experienc'd. This, I conceive, is the Caſe of *Scotland*; The generality of the Nobility and Gentlemen, and the whole Body of the Clergy, are in His Majeſty's Intereſt: The Diſaffection which was conſiderable in ſome Places, is in a great Meaſure deſtroy'd by thoſe Forfeitures and Attainders, which follow'd upon that Rebellion.

If the Government then has ſo little to fear from *Scotland*, I ſhould be glad to be inform'd of the Reaſons for believing, that there is any ſuch Diſaffection here, as to make ſo great an Army neceſſary; for if there is no ſuch Diſaffection, then it muſt be allow'd, that this Army is needleſs and expenſive, not to mention any thing of the Danger of it. Did ever a Prince, whoſe Title was diſputed, come to a Crown in a more peaceable manner than his Majeſty? Or, did ever a Prince whoſe Right was grounded upon an Act of

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the Eſtates, without the Advantage of Proximity of Blood, which ſo many had before him, meet, in ſo long a Time, with fewer Struggles and Rebellions?

I wou'd not be thought to argue, that there is not a diſcontented Party at preſent in the Nation; There never was, and I believe, never will be a Government without Malcontents; and there has been no *Period* of Time in *England*, without ſuch: But thus much may be ſaid, that in many preceding Reigns, the Government has been in greater Danger from a diſaffected Party, than the preſent is, without having had Recourſe to ſuch a Violent Remedy as a Standing Army to ſecure themſelves.

In order to prove this, it will not be needful to look further back than to the Time of the Diſpute for the Crown, between the Houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, During the Courſe of that deſtructive War, each Party in its Turn had the Advantage; yet we no where find, when a Prince of either Side was on the Throne, any Attempt made to continue their Forces, tho' there was a Pretender to the Throne, and a powerful Diſaffected Party in the Kingdom.

NOTWITHSTANDING the happy Concluſion of that War by *Henry* the Seventh, in the Union of the two Houſes, ſcarce had a Year of his Reign paſt, before a dangerous Rebellion broke out, which obliged that King to put his Crown to the Hazard of a Battle at *Stoke-Field*. It was ſupported by the Dutcheſs of *Burgundy* with Foreign Forces, and headed by the Earl of *Lincoln*, a Man of Parts and Courage, whom his Uncle, *Richard* the Third, had in Parliament declared his Succeſſor. Nor was the following Part of King *Henry*'s Government leſs diſturbed by Inſurrections and Rebellions, ſupported by Foreign Powers, in Favour of a baſe fictitious Pretender; yet, neither the mock Claim of *Warbeck*, own'd by Sovereign Princes, nor the great Diſaffection which appear'd many Times in his Reign, were Motives with that Prince, for his Wiſdom term'd the *Solomon* of *England*, to continue any Part of thoſe Forces which the frequent Troubles in his Reign obliged him to raiſe.

THE *Engliſh* Hiſtory mentions no Reign wherein the Government, and Perſon of the Sovereign were in more Danger from a diſaffected Party, than that of Queen *Elizabeth*: Several Rebellions were rais'd againſt her, and many

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many Plots contriv'd to take away her Life: The Changes ſhe brought about in Religion, made the Roman Catholicks, then very numerous in the Kingdom, ready to lay hold on every Opportunity to diſquiet her Government; and a conſtant Correſpondence was carried on between them and the Miniſters of the King of *Spain*, her declar'd Enemy, the moſt powerful and politick Prince then in *Europe*: Certainly, all Circumſtances rightly conſider'd, there never was a Time which ſeem'd more to require the keeping of Standing Forces, or in which more plauſible Reaſons might have been advanc'd, to ſhew the Neceſſity of ſo doing: But that great Queen, who perfectly underſtood her Intereſt, and who was ſerv'd by as able a Miniſtry as ever ſerv'd the Crown of *England*, knew very well, that the beſt and ſafeſt Support of her Throne, was to be had in the Affection of her Subjects, which a Standing Army was not at that Time look'd upon as likely to procure her.

EVEN after the happy Reſtoration of King *Charles* the Second, Pretences could not have been wanting to have ask'd for a Standing Army, had it not been look'd upon as inconſiſtent with the Liberty of the People: For at that Time there was a ſtrong Republican Party

Party in the Kingdom, among whom were great Number of as good Officers and Soldiers, as that Age produc'd, and who wanted nothing but an Opportunity to overturn the Government; againſt which, they were deſperately reſolv'd, as their many Attempts, during the firſt four or five Years of that Reign plainly ſhew'd: Yet, 'tis certain, that for ſome Years after the Reſtoration, the Forces did not amount to above three Thouſand Men, and thoſe conniv'd at, but never allow'd by the Parliament. And ſo far was the Nation in this Reign from thinking that a Plot made it neceſſary to augment the Troops, that when the Parliament petition'd the King to reduce that Army, which had been rais'd upon the Proſpect of a Foreign War, *T. Oates*'s Plot was under their Examination: By the Evidence firſt given in, it did appear to be of a very horrid Nature, and to threaten both the Perſon of the King and the eſtabliſh'd Religion: But the Parliament, it ſeems, did not think that an Army of Sixteen or Eighteen Thouſand Men was neceſſary to prevent the Miſchiefs they apprehended from it; for it was at that Time, and indeed, has been generally ſince thought, That the Diſcovery of a Plot was the Diſappointment of it. I do not pretend to ſay, that no Plot makes it neceſſary to raiſe Forces, becauſe ſome Plots differ

fer extreamly from others. It is a Word of as general and undetermin'd a Signification, as moſt in our Language. Some Actions are made to paſs for a Plot, by the Improvement they receive from thoſe to whom they are uſeful. As when a ſcribbling Correſpondence carried on by three or four Perſons, who have Inclination, but neither Power nor Capacity to raiſe a Rebellion, is termed a moſt dangerous Plot and Conſpiracy. Certain it is, ſome Plots are contriv'd for the Ruin of Kings, but more for the Deſtruction of the Liberty of the People: Others are no more than Lies hatch'd and brought up by ill deſigning Men, and artfully broach'd at a certain Juncture, in order to bring their own Deſigns to paſs.

THERE is no Man, except he who is led by Prejudice, but will own, that the Circumſtances of King *William*'s Government, after the War, requir'd as great a Number of Forces for its Defence as the preſent does. The *French* King, the greateſt Prince then in *Europe*, was a known Friend to King *James* and his Son; publickly ſupported them, and wanted nothing but an Opportunity of ſetting that Abdicated Monarch again upon the Throne, which a Party here, that had given King *William*'s Government more Trouble than they have done any ſince, and put his Perſon

Perſon in great Danger, were ready, on every Occaſion, to promote. But what Reaſon is there to think the Pretender ſo dreadful, that to defend ourſelves againſt him, there are need of more Forces, than were neceſſary to defend us againſt King *James* and *Lewis* XIV? Upon what is grounded this Opinion of the Pretender's Intereſt? Has the Party made any great or dangerous Efforts in his Favour ſince His Majeſty's Acceſſion? Has *France*, which can beſt do it, given him the leaſt Aſſiſtance? Or, indeed, has any conſiderable Prince in *Europe* done it, except the King of *Spain*? (who is at too great a Diſtance to do us much hurt;) And then only, after we had deſtroy'd his Fleet, and openly declar'd our ſelves his Enemy; and no ſooner was there any Proſpect of Peace, but he was forced to quit that Country: Here then, we have got near ten Thouſand Men more to defend us againſt the Pretender, than were requiſite in the Reign of King *William*, to defend him againſt King *James*; yet, the Pretender is drove as far from *England* as *Italy*, without a ſingle Regiment of Foot, any Ships, or Ordinance, or Money, more than is neceſſary, to give him Bread; or, without the Support of any conſiderable Prince in *Europe*; or without, indeed, its being the Intereſt of any of them, to ſet him upon the Throne of *Britain*. To main-

a Great Army, to oppoſe a Man thus ſupported, and thus provided to invade us, when the Government carries every thing before it, and has a Parliament Zealous in its Intereſt, is ſomething as remarkable, as any thing which has yet happened.

By what has been already ſaid, I think it may, upon good Grounds, be affirm'd, that there has not often a Time been, in which leſs Diſaffection has appear'd, than ſince His Majeſty's Happy Acceſſion, and that in many other Reigns it has been infinitely greater; and, I do believe, That if the Fear of a diſaffected Party had been a good Argument for the continuing an Army, it might have been with much more Reaſon made uſe of in many other Reigns than in this.

Sure, if Men would give but a little Attention, they would eaſily ſee, that to aſſert ſuch a Diſaffection to be in the Nation, as to make ſo great an Army neceſſary, is equally falſe and unjuſt: For was not his Majeſty's Succeſſion to the Crown ſettled by the Repreſentatives of the People?

Was he not, upon his coming into *England*, receiv'd with the moſt hearty Expreſſions of Joy and Satisfaction? How few of his Pre-

Predeceſſors have ſo long reign'd, with ſo much Eaſe and Quietneſs? And it muſt, in Juſtice to the Nation be ſaid, That no King of *England*, notwithſtanding the vaſt Burthen of Debts it groans under, has had his own Expences, or the Expences of his Government, more fully ſupply'd. If theſe Things are not a ſufficient Proof of a general Loyalty and Obedience, it is hard to tell what may paſs for ſuch.

BUT how can any Man advance, That his Majeſty has loſt that Affection of his People, which in the beginning was ſo viſible: Has not his Adminiſtration here, ever ſince, been ſuch, as has render'd him amiable to all his People, and reflected Honour on the Nation thro' all the World? If, then, his Majeſty has not loſt the Affection of his Subjects, as indeed its impoſſible he ſhould, What need is there of ſo Great an Army? To aſſert, That a King Reigns here by the Power of an Army, or maintains himſelf upon the Throne by it, is to give as black an Idea of him, and his Government, as the Malice of his Enemies can invent; and tends to nothing ſo much, as to make a Breach between him and his Subjects, by raiſing Diſtruſt and Jealouſie, and thereby bring the whole into Danger.

It is ſaid, and with good Reaſon, no doubt, That his Majeſty is ſo good, and juſt a Prince, that what Power ſoever ſuch an Army gives him, he will never employ it to the Deſtruction of the Liberty of his Subjects.

This I readily grant; but is it to be thought, that ſucceeding Princes will firmly adhere to his Majeſty's Example, or that they will be endow'd with the ſame Principles of Juſtice and Moderation, which ſo eminently appear in his Perſon, and in thoſe of his Family, with whom the Nation has the Happineſs of being acquainted? No, theſe are Bleſſings rather to be wiſh'd for, than expected.

Had it not been for this Reaſon, King *William* might, with as great Safety as any other, have been truſted with ſuch an Army: He had been bred up in a Common-wealth, had no Children, in whoſe Favour, he might be tempted to aſſume an Abſolute Power, and which was ſtill more, had deliver'd the Nation from the Apprehenſions of it, and was not likely to fall into an Error, which had prov'd ſo fatal to his Predeceſſor. Beſides, is it not the Duty of the preſent Age to tranſmit to their Poſterity, free from ſuch Danger, that

that Conſtitution which they receiv'd from their Predeceſſors, and which coſt them ſo much Blood and Treaſure: But whether that Nation can be ſaid to be free, if any Power is eſtabliſh'd, by which that Freedom may be taken away from them, I leave to be conſider'd. From the Time of the Eſtabliſhment of the Prætorian Bands by *Auguſtus*, *Rome* certainly loſt her Liberty, and was no more free under that Prince, than ſhe were under *Caligula* or *Nero*; tho' few or no Acts of Arbitrary Power was exerciſed under the firſt.

THE Revolution is often mentioned, as a Proof of the Difficulty of making an *Engliſh* Army the Inſtruments of enſlaving their Country; but this carries little or no Weight with it. King *James*, indeed, among other Errors, likewiſe committed that one, of not modelling his Army in ſuch a manner, as to make them capable of ſerving his Purpoſes: The greateſt Part of the Regiments of that Army, were commanded by Men of Quality and Fortune, whom he vainly believed he could ſecure to his Intereſt; by the many Favours he beſtow'd upon them: Had he advanc'd to chief Commands, Men of low Birth, deſperate Fortunes, or abandon'd Lives, who cou'd not have been conſiderable under any other Government, or upon any Revolution,

it

it is likely he had not been abandon'd by his Forces in ſnch a manner: But that Army had a ſtrong Inducement to leave King *James*, at leaſt, ſuch of them who were capable of ſeeing thro' the Prince of *Orange*'s Deſigns. A War with *France* was to be the certain Conſequence of the Succeſs of that Invaſion, in which, the Officers of the Army had a better Proſpect of Advancement, than by continuing here in Peace: For there was no body at that Time, of any great Share of Underſtanding, who might not have foreſeen, that the States could never have been in ſuch a manner engag'd in that Enterprize, had it not been upon a Confidence, that in Caſe of Succeſs, this Nation would be drawn into that War which coſt ſo much Blood and Treaſure in the Proſecution, and of which, they and others principally reap'd the Benefit. Thoſe who believe they acted upon any other View than this, are but little acquainted with the Nature of that People, or with their Inclinations towards us. *Holland* is the Rival of *England* in Trade, and into whatever Factions or Diviſions we fall, the more they will gain upon us: To this, nothing could more contribute, than a diſputed Title, or a Competition for the Crown; and the Event fully anſwer'd their Expectation, for the Parliament being at that Time poſſeſs'd with an extraordinary Fit of Generoſity,

Generosity, granted them Six Hundred Thousand Pounds for defraying the Expences of that Expedition, which was as much, if not more, necessary, for their Preservation than for ours. Afterwards, the far greatest Part of that vast Treasure which was sent from *England* to carry on those long Wars in the Low Countries, center'd in *Holland*; and in order to keep firm to our Interest, those good Protestant Neighbours, we never have since ventured to make any Effort for the Recovery of that Fishing Trade, which to the Reproach of the *English* Nation, they carry on upon the *British* Coasts, and which yearly brings them in such an immense Profit.

ANOTHER thing greatly contributed to bring about the Revolution, and that was the Extraordinary Address of the Prince of *Orange*, in contriving and carrying on that Design: He, with great Affection, congratulated King *James* on the Birth of his Son, order'd his Name to be put among those who were every Day pray'd for in his Chappel, which continu'd almost to the Time of his Embarkation; and even upon the publishing of his Declarations, nothing could appear more publickly guided than his Intentions: The Calling a free Parliament, the Restoring the Laws, the Redress of Grievances, the bringing Evil Ministers

Miniſters to Juſtice, (for the King by the Law can do no Ill) the having his Doubts ſatisfy'd as to the Birth of the then Prince of *Wales*, ſeem'd to be all his Aim: In ſhort, one wou'd have believed, that his only Deſign was to ſettle the Conſtitution, the Rights and Liberties of the People, in ſuch a manner, as to put it out of the Power of King *James*, or any other, ever after to be able to invade them; ſo that it is not to be doubted, but that a great many of the Army, upon that Proſpect of Redreſs of Grievances, join'd King *William*; which otherwiſe they would never have been brought to do, had they believed that the Crown was to have been placed upon his own Head, and a Change made in the Succeſſion. In carrying on great Deſigns Men very often over reach themſelves, and are brought to go thoſe Lengths which at firſt they did not intend: But it was happy for the Nation it thus fell out, without which, we could not have enjoy'd the preſent Bleſſing of having this Moſt Illuſtrious Houſe to reign over us, under whoſe Wiſe Adminiſtration, the Kingdom has ſo Wonderfully proſper'd. Upon the whole it may be concluded, that the Revolution was brought about by ſuch an unaccountable Combination of proſperous Circumſtances, as will, in all Probability, ſeldom, or never meet again; and tho' I am very favourably inclin'd to think well

well of the Honeſty of my Countrymen, eſpecially conſidering how much of it appears in the preſent Age, yet I cannot but believe, that Twenty Thouſand Men will ever be found, who will be baſe enough to ſacrifice their Country to their own private Intereſt.

I have often heard it alledg'd, that this Army is not ſo ſtrong, as to be able to enſlave ſuch a populous Country, which upon many Occaſions has ſhewn itſelf ſo vigorous in defence of its Liberty. This Argument, however plauſible, will, if I miſtake not, be found upon Examination, to be of as little Force as any of the reſt: It were indeed to be wiſhed, that no more Additions might hereafter be made to the Army, but in our Days we have ſeen it near doubled, tho' it will be hard, if not impoſſible, to make it appear, that there is a greater Occaſion for Forces now, than there was after the Peace made at *Ryſwick*: Precedents of this kind are apt to multiply, nor is there any likelyhood at preſent, of the Crown's looſing Ground in this matter.

BESIDES a great Number of reduced Officers upon Half Pay, who depend on the Government, and are ſubject to the Martial Law, as appears by the Execution of thoſe of them taken at *Preſton*; a Thing rarely before known, that a Man could be an Officer with-

out having a Commiſſion, or be ſubject to the Martial Law, without being either Officer or Soldier: I ſay, beſides this, there is another Advantage: The Army here, and that in *Ireland*, are conſtituted in ſuch a manner, as to be much more formidable than appears at firſt View; for upon the *Britiſh* Eſtabliſhment, they have kept up the Corps of above Thirty Thouſand Men, the Number of Soldiers being no ways proportionable to the Regiments and Officers. This was the Contrivance made uſe of in the Reduction in the Year Seventeen, which in Reality did not deſerve to be called by that Name, being done in ſuch a manner, as in a great Meaſure defeated the End and Deſign of it: The Horſe likewiſe, which are raiſed with the moſt Difficulty and Expence, do here very much exceed in Number that Proportion, which is generally kept in Armies between them and the Foot: So that whoever conſiders the Army that is on Foot in *Britain*, and that in our Neighbouring Kingdom of *Ireland*, modell'd after the ſame manner, with the great Number of Half Pay Officers which are in both, ſufficient, I may ſay, for twenty Thouſand Men, will eaſily perceive, that ſuch a Military Power is eſtabliſh'd, as may juſtly be eſteem'd formidable, and be able with Eaſe to give Laws to theſe Nations.

CÆSAR

CÆSAR with an Army not ſo great, deſtroy'd the Liberty of the *Roman* Commonwealth: *Philip*, and his Son *Alexander* with fewer Forces, gave Laws to *Greece*, the braveſt and freeſt Country then in the World: *Lewis* the Eleventh laid the Foundation of the abſolute Power of the Crown of *France* with an Army not much exceeding Twenty Thouſand Men. I could give many more Inſtances of this kind, were it neceſſary, but what puts this paſt all Contradiction, is, that not long ago an Army of Seventeen Thouſand Men put an end to the Conſtitution, and made the Government here, in all Reſpects as abſolutely military, as that at *Conſtantinople*: If therefore *Oliver Cromwel* cou'd, with this Army, which was for the moſt part compoſed of Men (tho' miſtaken) yet of Probity and Principles, and whoſe Notions of Liberty were very ſtrong, deſtroy that Parliament whoſe Reputation was then at a great Height, and their Power dreadful both at Home and Abroad; what may not, hereafter, a Prince of Parts and Ambition do, eſpecially in an Age, when Men are unreſtrain'd by any Principles of Virtue or Senſe of Religion? This Example proves not only what Power ſuch a Number of regular Forces have, but

likewiſe, what an Army may be brought to do; and it's very eaſy to account for it, when we hear it ſaid, that *Oliver Cromwel* was more abſolute, and did greater Acts of Power than any King of *England*: Why truly, it was only becauſe he was Maſter of a greater Army than any King of *England* had ever been.

But ſhould a King here attempt to make himſelf abſolute, would he not make Choice of ſuch a Miniſtry, and of ſuch Civil Officers, from whom he might expect a ready Compliance: Are ſuch Men hard to be found? The Hiſtory of moſt Countries furniſh us with Examples of the contrary.

The Nobility have not at preſent that Power which they enjoy'd before the Time of *Henry* the Seventh, and by means of which they made ſuch great Stands againſt the Encroachments of the Crown; and neither they, nor the Commons, have any Authority out of Parliament, whoſe Sitting altogether depends upon the Crown: And it is highly reaſonable to believe, that if in the Reign of King *Charles* the Firſt, there had been an Army in *Britain*, but of the fourth Part of the Preſent, a Redreſs of

thoſe

thoſe Grievances of which they complain'd, could never have been had.

I here beg leave to ask, if this great Army is ever to be reduc'd to the Number allow'd by Parliament in the two former Reigns? And if ſo, what more proper Time can be found than the preſent? Or when is a better like to happen?

It may be the Dangers of the late Plot are not fully remov'd or diſcover'd: Grant it ſhould be ſo: By theſe Particulars with which the Publick was acquainted, it did not ſeem to be ſo wiſely laid, or deeply contrived as to appear with the moſt threatning Aſpect: For any thing of Senſe or Contrivance, that was in *Layer*'s Scheme, he might have formed it in his Sleep; the whole of which was ſo chimerical, and the Parts ſo inconſiſtent, that it looked more like the Dreams of a Man in a Fever, than a Scheme capable of overturning the Government. There was another Thing whimſical enough in this Plot; very few of the Plotters had any Intimacy, or ſcarce Knowledge of each other: This had done pretty well, had the whole been directed by any one Man, or Society, or Club, but no ſuch there appear'd: So that here was a

Plot

Plot without any Communication of Counſels or Deſigns, even among the chief of the Plotters. Sure it was in all Reſpects the moſt extraordinary one of the kind that ever was known, heard, or read of: But if it ſhould be ſo, that this Plot which is now in a good old Age, this being *Anno Ætatis ſuæ Tertio*, a great Age indeed for a Plot, ſhou'd not be fully diſcover'd, nor the Dangers of it prevented; cannot this be done tho' the Army were reduc'd to the uſual Number of Guards and Garriſons. I am apt to think, that ſuch an Action as this, would more free the Government from the Dangers of a Plot, and more defeat the Ends of thoſe who are in Love with Plotting, than the additional Forces lately raiſed: One would indeed be inclined to believe, were not their Judgment better inform'd by their Superiors, that there is Strength enough in the Government, ſupported by the Laws and the Authority of Parliament, to ſuppreſs any Plots when diſcover'd, without the Aſſiſtance of a great Army or additional Forces.

Since this Plot has been the Occaſion of theſe additional Forces being raiſed, and that there ſeems to be a Deſign of continuing them, I ſhall here ſet down the Arguments I have heard advanc'd for ſo doing.

And

And first of all, these Gentlemen assert it as a Proposition of unquestionable Truth, that the Plot made it necessary to add four Thousand Men to the Army.

The next Argument is, That if they are reduc'd, the Disaffected may again Plot; whereas, the continuing of them will discourage or defeat all such Attempts.

Lastly, they affirm, That those Forces make the Government considerable abroad, and will hinder any of our Neighbouring States from joining with, or assisting the Pretender.

As to the first of these Arguments, I think there are but few, who have taken any Pains to examine this Matter, who may not be able to judge whether the Legislature could have suppress'd the Plot without these additional Forces.

The following Argument carries with it a double Supposition, without any Proof to support it. If they suppose that they will prevent a Correspondence being carried on between some restless People here,

and

and a few Exiles abroad, it ſeems to be plain, that this will happen, whether they are continued or reduc'd: Such a Correſpondence, or Plot, for ſuch a Senſe that Word has had ſometimes impoſed upon it, has been ever carried on ſince the Revolution, and will, it's more than probable, be ſtill continued: Dangers of this Kind are certainly very inconſiderable, and are to be prevented more by the Diligence and Addreſs of a Miniſtry, than by an Army. But what Ground is there to believe, that any Plot is like to happen; and eſpecially ſuch a one, which this Government, having ſo many Friends, whoſe All depends upon its Preſervation, may not render ineffectual without theſe additional Forces. Has it not, on its Side, the Civil Power, the Laws, and a conſiderable Army? Surely the Aſſertion is too groſs to be maintain'd: Beſides, it is a very bad way of Reaſoning to ſay, That to avoid an Evil which may poſſibly happen, a Nation is to bring upon it ſelf a real and certain one: For this Army muſt, by all Honeſt and Intelligent Men, be allowed to be ſuch.

As for theſe Forces preventing Dangers from Abroad, I would willingly be inform'd who they are that are inclined to aſſiſt the Pretender?

Pretender, for if there is no ſuch Deſign, then thoſe Additionals are needleſs, and in this Reſpect, neither give nor take any Weight from the Government: This, I will venture to ſay, may be as clearly prov'd, as the Nature of ſuch a Propoſition will allow; that it is not the Intereſt of any one conſiderable Potentate in *Europe*, to ſet the Pretender on the *Britiſh* Throne, unleſs we allow his Holineſs the Pope to be of that Number, who, no doubt, would be glad to be free from the Expence of his Maintainance.

Affairs Abroad, are in ſuch a manner ſettled by his Majeſty's great Care and Wiſdom, as makes this a ſafe Time for a Reduction in the Army.

France, our neareſt Neighbour, and the moſt capable of hurting us, is our Friend and Confederate, by the Tripple Alliance.

The *Dutch*, are our True, and Good Proteſtant Neighbours.

For the Emperor we have ſent out expenſive Fleets, made War, and ſaved Kingdoms:

The Peace with *Spain* has for ſome Years paſt, and does now, only want the Forms of a Congreſs to finiſh it. That War was certainly enter'd into, upon juſt Grounds; yet, there is a Maxim which ſhould be well conſider'd by all Miniſters; That every Action which has a greater Tendency in it, to produce Evil than Good, ſhould be carefully avoided: The few Male-Contents among us have been loudly complaining that the evil Conſequences of a War with *Spain*, was obvious to every Man's Underſtanding: That *England* carried on a very beneficial Trade with that Country, which was, during the Courſe of that War, in a great meaſure loſt: That the *Dutch* had in that Time carried our Commodities into *Spain*, by which, they had the greateſt Share of the Profit. Theſe Male Contents further alledge, That Trade is of ſuch a Nature, That when forc'd out of its uſual Channel, it is with difficulty brought into it again: That there were other States in *Europe*, who had greater Intereſt to engage themſelves in that Quarrel; and as much Power to do it, conſidering the vaſt Debt with which the Publick is here burdened. I have heard it at that Time ſaid, as a Reaſon for our engaging in that War, that

Britain

Britain was Guarantee for the Peace of *Italy:* But that could not be, for the Kingdom of *Sicily* is no Part of *Italy*; nor can we ſuppoſe that thoſe Gentlemen pretended to the Power of declaring what is Geography, tho' perhaps they may the Senſe of an Article of a Treaty: But that *Britain* was Guarantee, even for the Peace of *Italy*, was in my Opinion altogether groundleſs. By the Treaty of *Utretcht*, *England* was indeed Guarantee for the Neutrality of *Italy*, till the general Peace, but when that was concluded, was no farther concerned it. But no one will ſay, That *Italy* wou'd be in more Danger, by *Sicily*'s being in the Poſſeſſion of the King of *Spain*, than in the Emperor's. It is plain, the King of *Spain* is not ſo powerful by Land, as the Emperor, but if he were, what caſts the Ballance, is the Entry the Emperor has into *Italy*, thro' his Hereditary Country of *Tyrol*; whereas *Spain* has no acceſs to it, but by Sea: And how *Italy* comes to be ſafer, by *Sicily*'s being in in the Hands of the Emperor, than under the Dominion of the Duke of *Savoy*, to whoſe Share it fell by that Peace, which they pretend to defend, is to me hard to tell. Was not his Imperial Majeſty great enough in that Country, by the Kingdom of *Naples*, and Dukedom of *Millan*, without

out this new acquiſition of *Sicily*? He therefore who wou'd be inform'd of the Cauſes of that War, muſt look ſomewhere elſe: But that which exceeds all Belief, is, that after ſo many Victories, and the War proſperouſly ended, any mention ſhould have been made, of the Surrender of *Gibraltar* or *Port-Mahone*; a Thing which was never hinted, or ſo much as thought of, before this War was begun: The Advantages of thoſe Places to *Britain*, have long ago, been very well ſhewn, and therefore I ſhall forbear to ſay any thing of them in this Place: But it is worthy of Obſervation, that ſome of thoſe very Men, who was ſo ſevere upon the Peace at *Utrecht*, were ſuſpected of the Deſign of giving up thoſe important Places, which that Treaty had procur'd us.

Being in ſo good Terms with our moſt powerful Neighbours, and the Peace with *Spain* wanting only the Forms of a Congreſs, it cannot be alledg'd, that any Proſpect of Danger from Abroad, can hinder a Reduction.

The Security of *England* againſt its Neighbours, conſiſts in its Situation, and the Goodneſs of its Fleet; and to think that this Country, whilſt it has ſo great a

one,

one, can be in any Danger from a Foreign Power, is ſomething as extravagant and fooliſh, as any thing in *Layer*'s Scheme, or *Plunket*'s Letters.

As our Security Abroad, depends upon our Fleet, ſo the Safety of the King, and his Government, can no where be ſo ſurely founded, as upon the Affection of his Subjects. This is a Security, which will make a King of *England* Proof againſt all Attempts; courted and eſteem'd by his Friends, and dreaded by his Enemies: All other endeavours after Security and Greatneſs, are idle and vain, and in this Country have ſeldom or never failed to ruin that Prince, who unhappily truſted to them. Force or Corruption may ſupport ſuch a Prince for a Time, but either of theſe will in the Concluſion, draw more heavy Difficulties upon him, than he will be able to cope with.

When a Prince's Deſigns tend to the general Benefit of his Subjects, when he ſtudies to be *Communis Pater Patriæ*, and to reign in the Hearts of all his Subjects; Such a Prince will rarely fail of reigning with Safety and Honour, and of receiving from his Subjects, all the Returns of Love and

and Gratitude. Such was the Reign of the Glorious Queen *Elizabeth*: No Penſioner-Parliament was heard of in her Days, nor was any Buſineſs carry'd in the Houſes, only by the Penſioners of the Court, and Members in Employment; nor was any Parliament in her Reign, ſuſpected of having conſulted their own Intereſt only, without any Regard had to the Publick: And ſuch has been his preſent Majeſty's Reign, and ſuch the Conduct of his Miniſters, and late Parliament.

Tho' the National Debts have been greatly encreas'd, yet the Money has been Wiſely employ'd, and much to the Honour and Safety of the Nation, by ſending out noble Fleets, for Uſeful and Profitable Ends.

Can Honeſt Men be ever enough thankful to the late Parliament, for repealing that Clauſe of the Act of Settlement, which confin'd his Majeſty to his *Britiſh* Dominions; ſince his Preſence every time he goes abroad, procures Advantages to *Britain* far exceeding any inconſiderable Loſs his Abſence occaſions.

Theſe, and other Things of the like Nature, are alone capable to deſtroy all Diſaffection:

affection: But two more Actions of theirs are never to be forgotten.

The first, the Act for continuing themselves seven Years; by which they effectually secur'd the Liberty of the People, in preventing the Confusions and Disorders which were like to ensue.

The other the *South Sea* Scheme, to pay off the Debts of the Nation: This Project, tho' wickedly executed, greatly shew'd the Wisdom and Integrity of those who appear'd in Favour of it: This will be a lasting Proof to latest Posterity, how disinterested all their Proceedings were, and how much they tended to the Publick Benefit: Nothing sure could comfort the Nation for the Loss of such Worthy Patriots, but the Hopes of seeing the present Parliament tread in the Steps of These, their Renowned Predecessors.

A good Agreement then between the King and his People, being the surest way to preserve the Government; I believe it will be impossible to prove, that a Great Army will ever be able to procure or preserve such an Agreement: Nay, I may venture to maintain, That if in any other Reign but

This,

This, ſuch a Number of Forces, as we have at preſent here, and in *Ireland*, were to be continued, the Conſtitution would ſoon be at an End, and this Government become a Military one. I confeſs, we are in no Danger at Preſent, we have the Good Fortune to live under a Prince, Who, tho' he has the Power, yet wants the Inclination to make us Slaves. But how melancholly is the Proſpect, when the Liberty of a Nation depends on the Will and Pleaſure of a Prince, how juſt ſoever. Nations are ſometimes eaſy under the moſt abſolute Princes, as *Rome* was under *Trajan*, and the three ſucceeding Emperors. The Happineſs of a People is, when the Government is ſo eſtabliſh'd, that whatever a Prince's Inclinations are, it is not in his Power to make himſelf a Tyrant; for Power does ſtrangely alter the Nature of Men, and of a Prince who had otherwiſe been moderate, has often made a Tyrant.

Ever ſince the Eſtabliſhment of a Standing Army here, the Militia has been greatly, if not wholly neglected: A Militia Officer or Soldier, is now become a Character of Ridicule, and nothing is by ſome alledg'd to be more impracticable, than to make them

them ſufficient for the Defence of the Nation: But thoſe who are of this Opinion, are very little acquainted with Hiſtory either Ancient or Modern, or with the Conſtitution of their own Country in former Times.

The moſt conſiderable Victories, the *Romans* gain'd over their Neighbours, were obtain'd not by Standing Forces, but by their Militia; when indeed, they had extended their Conqueſts, they were obliged to keep regular Forces, but they ſoon put an end to the Commonwealth. The *Swiſs* Militia are a Body of Foot equal to the beſt; and the *Swediſh* Provincial Regiments, are looked upon to be as good, if not better, than their other Troops; and I ſee no Reaſon to believe, that our Militia would not be equal to theirs, were the ſame Care taken of them. The Common People of *England*, are allow'd to be as brave as any in the World; and the Officers, or Soldiers, of a Militia Regiment, muſt be allow'd to have natural Courage, and Activity equal to thoſe of a Standing Regiment, and having commonly more at Stake than the others, it is but reaſonable to think would appear as brave in Defence of their Property: The Succeſs of the Parliament Forces

at *Newbury*, was owing to the Militia Regiments of *London*; and *Ludlow* ſays, That the Victory at *Worceſter* was, in ſome meaſure, gain'd by the Militia: Even lately, *Steenbock* with ſome of the *Swediſh* Militia got together on the ſuddain, beat a *Daniſh* Army of Veteran Troops, ſome Part of which, had ſerved in *Flanders*.

I hope I ſhall not be ſo much miſunderſtood, as if I were of Opinion, that the whole Army ſhould be reduced: This might be ſubject to Inconveniences, unleſs ſome Methods were taken to make the Militia more uſeful, which would be no difficult matter; but what I have endeavour'd to prove, is, that it ſhould at leaſt be reduc'd to the Number it conſiſted of after the Peace at *Ryſwick*. And ſince it appears to be next to a Demonſtration, That an Army of Thirty Thouſand Men is capable of enſlaving a greater Nation than ours; Will it not be Prudence in us to be upon our Guard, and, if poſſible, to find out ſome Expedient to prevent any ſucceeding Prince from employing ſuch a Power to ſuch an End. If it is pretended, that the Circumſtances of theſe preſent Times, make this Army neceſſary, there is no Ground to doubt but that as ſtrong Reaſons may be found

found out, in every future Reign: This Age therefore, is like to have the Glory of ſetting a Precedent for continuing ſo great an Army, upon no other apparent Grounds, than the Fears of Diſaffection, Plots, and Dangers which may happen from Abroad: Whereas, no Diſaffection, or Plots, have appear'd ſince his Majeſty's Acceſſion, but what have manifeſtly ſhewn their own Weakneſs, and the Strength of the Government; and Affairs abroad, to every Man's Underſtanding, ſeem to favour our Security: What no former Age was ever ſo mad as to imagine; what the Penſioner Parliament could not hear without Terrour; what King *James*'s Parliament, the moſt complying that *England* had in ſome Ages ſeen, rejected with Indignation, we are at laſt like to ſee brought about in our Days. Is this the Advantage gain'd after ſuch long and proſperous Wars, and ſo much Treaſure expended? Are all the mighty Benefits of the Revolution, which was undertaken to free us from Arbitrary Power, to end at laſt in a Standing Army? Are all the Advantages, ariſing from that Deliverance, which coſt ſo much Blood and Treaſure, to end, in eſtabliſhing a Power which may ſet up the worſt of all Governments, a Military one? A Tyrannical Prince may be

curb'd by his Subjects, but when ſupported by ſuch an Army, the Evil hardly ſeems capable of a Remedy.

Surely thoſe Men who are ſo zealous for continuing this Army, can be no Friends to the Ends for which the Revolution was undertaken: To talk of Liberty in this Country when a Prince has at his Devotion Thirty Thouſand Men, is a Jeſt and a Ridicule, and a groſs Impoſition on Men's Underſtanding: Such a Liberty as this, is nothing more than an Indulgence, owing to the Diſpoſition and Temper of him who governs, and ceaſes ſo ſoon as a Prince of another turn of Mind mounts the Throne.

No Man has a greater Reſpect for any Profeſſion, than I have for a Military one; and certainly, no Body of Men ought to be look'd upon with more Regard or Favour, or ſhould be better provided for by the Publick, than thoſe, who have expoſed their Lives in Defence of their Country: But the continuing of them in Times of Peace, has deſtroy'd that Liberty which was almoſt every where eſtabliſh'd in *Europe*, upon the Deſtruction of the *Roman* Empire: And if after ſo many Examples, we fall into the like Error, it muſt look like the greateſt of Infatuations.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the finiſhing of this Diſcourſe, I have ſeen ſomething offer'd in one of the *Britons*, to ſhew the Neceſſity of continuing the Forces: I thought I had anſwer'd thoſe Arguments, which with moſt Reaſon cou'd be offer'd upon that Head; but as he has given ſome others of a different kind, I ſhall ſet them down, that the Reader may ſee, to what wretched Trifling and Abſurdities they are reduc'd, who would maintain this Propoſition.

Firſt of all, I muſt obſerve, That the Author of that Paper has miſtaken the State of the Argument. The Queſtion is not whether the Army ſhould be reduc'd, but whether it is not neceſſary to reduce a Part of it: What therefore he was obliged to prove, was, That the Conſtitution and Government could not be ſafe with an Army ſmaller

ſmaller than the Preſent. Thoſe Clamours, as he terms them, raiſed every Seſſion of Parliament, and thoſe violent Harangues, have only been made againſt the Greatneſs of the Army, and not againſt the Army conſider'd as ſuch.

Standing Armies, ſays he, have furniſh'd the Jacobite Male-contents with a Topick for declamatory Ribaldry, from the Revolution to theſe Times: This Phraſe of Jacobite Male-contents, may ſerve to ſhew what kind of Rhetorick this Gentleman is Maſter of; for I think, we can hardly ſuppoſe a Man to be a Jacobite, without his being at the ſame Time a Male-content; and who thoſe Jacobites are, and what this Ribaldry is, he lets us underſtand, when he mentions theſe violent Harangues of late made againſt Fictions, Chimeras, and Standing Armies. I believe, that had not theſe Gentlemen in their Harangues given better Reaſons for a Reduction in the Army, than he has done for the contrary, the very offering of ſuch weak Arguments as his are, or the handling the Subject in the manner he has done, would have been enough to have convinc'd every one of the badneſs of their Cauſe. Nothing, ſure, can be ſo provoking, as to hear a Man, with Inſolence

advance

advance the moſt wretched Arguments, and at the ſame Time, treat theſe of his Oppoſers, with general abuſive Names.

By a kind of Logick peculiar to himſelf, he would perſwade us, that there neither is, nor has been a Standing Army in Great *Britain*, ſince the Year Eighty Eight. Of this Truth, he ſays, all Perſons muſt be convinc'd, who know what a Standing Army is. It ſeems indeed, to me, to be paſt all Contradiction, that this Author is ſo far from knowing what an Army is, that he does not even know the general meaning of the Word. Has there been an Army in *Britain* ſince Eighty Eight, and is it not a Standing Army? By what Name will he be pleas'd to call it? His Diſtinction is ſomething remarkable. When the Prince, ſays he, keeps a Number of armed Men in Pay, without the Conſent of the People, in order to Oppreſs them, that I call a Standing Army, and is ſomewhat ſo deſtructive to the Liberties of the Subject, that I look upon it as the Duty of every honeſt Man to remonſtrate againſt it. But ſuppoſe that a Prince had, with the Conſent of his People, kept up an Army forty Years, would it not have been abſurd in that Time to have deny'd, that ſuch a one was a Standing Army.

my. I think, in the propiety of Language, when we mention an Army, the Word implys a Body of Men ſubſiſting, or ſtanding, for at the ſame Time that it ceaſes to ſtand, it ceaſes to be an Army. Uſe indeed, has ſo far obtain'd, that an armed Force kept up in a State in Times of Peace, is commonly called a Standing Army, in Oppoſition to thoſe Armies which are only continued during the Time that a Nation is engaged in War. But here, we have an Army rais'd and continu'd by the Conſent of the People, and ſo not like to oppreſs them or deſtroy their Liberty. The Conſent of the People will never alter the Nature of Armies, which is, generally ſpeaking, to obey the Orders of thoſe, by whoſe Commiſſion they act: Of this we have Inſtances in the *Dutch* Armies, under the Command of ſome of the Princes of *Orange*. The Forty One Army was raiſed and continued with the Conſent of the People, and yet, it deſtroy'd their Liberty, and put an end to the Conſtitution: What I ſay now, I mean of Armies in general, and not of our preſent Army, from which, as I ſaid in another Place, we have nothing to apprehend, while under his Majeſty's Direction: He concludes this Argument with asking, If a ſmall and neceſſary Number of Men, appointed by Parliament

for

for the Defence of the Nation, is to be esteem'd dangerous? Or if the Liberties of of the Subject are incompatible with the Safety of His preſent Majeſty, or the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

To theſe I anſwer, That this is neither a ſmall, nor neceſſary Number of Men, but a great and formidable one, and not at all neceſſary for the Defence of the Nation. The Author of the *Briton* has given us no Proof that this is a ſmall and neceſſary Force; I hope I have ſhewn the contrary, and ſhall therefore ſay nothing of it here: Neither are the Liberties of the Subject in any reſpect incompatible with the Safety of His preſent Majeſty, or the Proteſtant Succeſſion, but there is no Reaſon to believe, that ſo great Forces are neceſſary, either for His Majeſty's Safety, or that of the Proteſtant Succeſſion. I am ſure he has not given any Proof of it, and, in my Opinion, they who affirm it, throw a very black Calumny on both. Before I leave this Head, I muſt obſerve, how much he is miſtaken in the Number of Forces, which, he ſays, do not amount to Sixteen Thouſand, whereas in Reality, they are very near double the Number of thoſe continued after the Peace at *Ryſwick*.

WHAT immediately follows, is ſomething more curious, becauſe it contains a Piece of Secret Hiſtory, at the ſame Time that it informs us of the Conſequences of disbanding Councils, as his Term is: King *William*, ſays he, was oblig'd, after the Peace of *Ryſwick*, by the frequent Remonſtrances of a diſcontented Parliament, to disband his Forces. The Author is either miſtaken here, or induſtriouſly conceals the Truth: For thoſe Remonſtrances were made, not by one, but by two ſucceſſive Parliaments. He has not, however, thought fit to tell us what they were diſcontented with; whether with ſo great an Army, or with King *William*'s Government, but the latter ſeems to be moſt probable of the two, by what he immediately adds, That the Jacobites carried their Point. But here follows the Conſequences, which, he ſays, are known to every one: The Jacobites carried their Point, and involv'd us in a Twenty Years War, begun by *France*, in Favour of the Pretender. Is it poſſible the *Briton* can believe, that it was our having an Army of Ten, in Place of Twenty Thouſand Men, that engag'd us in that War: But this War was begun by *France*, and in Favour too, of the Pretender. Did that Great Prince ſo little underſtand his Intereſt, that he would not at that Time have been ſatisfyd-

fy'd with his Grandſon's Poſſeſſion of the Monarchy of *Spain*, had it ſo pleas'd the Emperor, and the reſt of the Allies? And pray, How came that War to be begun in Favour of the Pretender, and not of the late King of *Spain*? I ask the Reader Pardon for Troubling him with Anſwers to ſuch Ribaldry; but by this he will ſee, as I ſaid before, with what kind of Arguments this new Doctrine of the Reaſonableneſs of continuing the preſent Number of Forces is ſupported.

AT the latter Part, ſays he, of the Queen's Reign, the Number of Forces then in Pay, gave no Uneaſineſs to our preſent Patriots. The Reaſon of this is plain: The Number of Forces, was then ſo ſmall, as not to be capable of giving any Uneaſineſs, and I durſt engage, that were they at preſent reduc'd to the Number they conſiſted of, in the latter End of Her Reign, Theſe Patriots, as he ſtiles 'em, would have their Apprehenſions and Fears of the Army, effectually cured: What he immediately adds, That the enliſted Men were then for the moſt Part *Iriſh* Papiſts, is a known Falſhood. I knew the Army at that Time, at leaſt, as well as he, and I never heard or knew of any *Iriſh* Papiſts taken into the Service, who were known to be ſuch; and, I

believe, he will be very much at a Loſs, to give any Inſtances of that Kind

HERE follows, to uſe his own Words, His Anſwer to the Principal, and only ſeeming Reaſonable Objection to the Number of Troops we maintain at preſent. The Objection is this: We are Iſlanders, and conſequently, our Fleet is ſufficient to defend us againſt all Foreign Invaſions, ſince whoever makes ſuch an Attempt, muſt be oblig'd to tranſport their Forces, which they can never Land, unleſs the Strength of their Maritime Powers be ſuperiour to ours: Here is certainly a very good Argument, to which may be added, That in Caſe they could Land their Forces, yet without being ſuperiour at Sea, it would be impoſſible to recruit or ſupply them, which is abſolutely neceſſary in an Enemies Country. As a Proof of this Argument, I ſhall give two Examples: The Firſt is that of the intended *Spaniſh* Invaſion in the Year Fifteen Hundred and Eighty Eight, when our Fleet preſerv'd us from being reduc'd to the Condition of a *Spaniſh* Province. The other Inſtance is, that Invaſion which threatned us from *France*, before the Battle of *La Hogue*, in the Year Ninty Two; But nothing ſure was ever read, like to the ſolution of this Objection: To ſhew, ſays he, the Fallacy of this way of reaſoning,

ſoning, I appeal to a Matter of Fact: Did not the Pretender Land in *Scotland* in deſpight of our Fleet? But was the Pretender's Landing in *Scotland*, a Foreign Invaſion, or tranſporting of Troops? Surely a more falſe Concluſion was never before drawn from ſo true a Principle. What had been, continues he, the Conſequences, had we depended entirely upon our Fleet, at the Battles of *Dumblain* and *Preſton*? Not to mention, that in Caſe of Domeſtick Commotions, our Fleet can be no ways ſerviceable: No Body ever ſuppos'd, that in a Civil War, a Fleet could be of any great Conſequence, unleſs Foreign States interpos'd: But what Domeſtick Commotions are like to happen, which the Government may not be able to ſuppreſs with the half of theſe Forces?

When he mentions the Number of Troops the *Dutch* maintain, he does not conſider, that this makes directly againſt himſelf: For, conſidering that they are upon the Continent, and almoſt every where ſurrounded with powerful Neighbours; that they have a large Barrier, and many other great fortify'd Towns to Gartiſon, Nothing of which is our Caſe: I ſay, whoever conſiders this, will be convinc'd, that in their Circumſtances, Thirty Thouſand Men, the Number they at preſent maintain,

 are

are not ſo many in Proportion, as Five Thouſand are to us.

In another Place he tells us, That our preſent Tranquility is owing to the Wiſdom of our Miniſters, and the Dread of our Arms; for it is ridiculous, continues he, to imagine, that Foreign Princes would long ſuffer us to enjoy our preſent Happineſs, if they did not fear to moleſt us. I readily grant, That our preſent Peace and Happineſs are owing to the Wiſdom of our Miniſters, but I cannot ſo eaſily believe, that any Foreign Power is afraid to attack us, becauſe we have near Twenty Thouſand, in Place of Ten Thouſand Men. He concludes this Argument with a Maxim, which, tho' very juſt, has no Relation to the preſent Caſe; That the beſt Laws are ineffectual without a Power to enforce the Execution of them; but that Power was never underſtood to ſignify a military Power; for that Maxim was no where better known, than in the Republicks of *Greece*; and, if I miſtake not, *Plutarch* mentions it as a Saying of *Solon*'s, tho' at the ſame Time they knew no ſuch Thing at *Athens*, or the other Republicks of *Greece*, as Standing Troops: But were not the Laws executed in *England* many Hundred Years, without the Help of this kind of Power!

It will not, I think, be improper to conſider, an Argument of his, which he terms unanſwerable. I ſhall ſet down the whole Paragraph: 'There is, ſays he, one unanſwerable Reaſon to be given for continuing the ſame Number of Forces we have at preſent: The Pretender and his Emiſſaries exclaim againſt it, and we may reaſonably conclude, whatever they oppoſe, is our Intereſt to promote: The Pretender, as I am inform'd, not being included in the Quadruple Alliance. The Courage of our *Engliſh* Soldiers he has beheld at a Diſtance, and fled from; and can entertain but ſmall Hopes of Succeſs, unleſs he could procure an Act of Parliament to diſband his Conquerors. I have no great Opinion of his Courage, but I believe, with ſome Reluctance, and much Perſwaſion, he might be prevail'd upon to face the County Militia, or City Train'd-Bands.' I leave it to any impartial Perſon to judge, whether more Ribaldry was ever comprehended in fewer Lines: I would gladly be inform'd, Whom he means by the Pretenders Emiſſaries? It is not improbable that he has affix'd to this Word, a Signification quite different from that which is commonly given to it: For my own Part, I never knew an Emiſſary of the Pretender's,

and it is not unlikely, that he is as little acquainted either with them, or their Sentiments, concerning the Army: But if by the Pretender's Emiſſaries he means his Friends, Is it a certain Conſequence that we muſt always differ from them? Is it not poſſible, that ſome of them having a large Property in this Country, may wiſh to ſee the Laws preſerv'd, by which that Property is ſecur'd, its Manufactures improv'd, and its Trade flouriſh? Are we therefore, in ſuch like Caſes, to differ from them, becauſe they are Friends, or if you pleaſe, Emiſſaries of the Pretender's. This way of Reaſoning brings to my Remembrance an Argument I have heard us'd by ſome Presbyterians, who would not comply with certain things in the Church of *England*, becauſe they were likewiſe practis'd by the Roman Catholicks; But it ſeems to be ſomething new, that any Reaſon ſhould be ſaid to be unanſwerable, becauſe it is maintain'd or oppos'd by any Party of Men: That Argument is only convincing, where clear and fair Deductions are made from certain or probable Principles, ariſing from the Nature of the Subject: In this Matter therefore, the Opinion of the Pretender, or his Emiſſaries, is very little to be conſider'd, but the Truth or Falſhood of the Propoſition it ſelf. In the Abundance of his Zeal, he cou'd not help reflecting on the Pretender's Courage:

It is an elegant Piece of Wit indeed, to ſay, that he is not included in the Quadruple Alliance; or, that with ſome Reluctance, and much Perſwaſion, he might be prevail'd upon to face the Militia: What makes this Reflection the more ſenſeleſs, is, that he himſelf has given us ſome Reaſon to believe the contrary, when he tells us, that he landed in *Scotland* in ſpite of our Fleet; for this, I ſuppoſe, cou'd not have been done without Danger. There is nothing more common, than to hear Men of different Intereſts or Principles, villify and aſperſe each other, and for no other Reaſon but becauſe of that Difference: Thus it happened to the late Duke of *Ormond*, who, in King *William*'s Reign was highly applauded for his Bravery in *Flanders*, yet this was deny'd by the very ſame Men, when he fell into different Meaſures in the latter Part of Her late Majeſty's Reign: And I remember, when a certain Great Man ſome Years ago happen'd to decline in the Favour of the Court, ſome of thoſe little Time-Servers had the Aſſurance, even to deny him that Quality, which has as eminently appear'd in him, as ever it did in the late King of *Sweden*. I look upon it to be the Duty of every honeſt Man, to do Juſtice, even to his Enemy, and to believe nothing that is ſaid to his Diſadvantage, unleſs that the ſame is ſupported by ſome Proof. The

Pretender is our Enemy, and as such I consider him, yet I cannot believe without some better Reasons, than the Author of the *Briton* has thought fit to give us, that he wants Courage. Mareshal *Villars* talks of him in a quite different manner; and could we be so partial as to judge of his Character, by what some of the *French* Nobility, who have long convers'd with him, affirm, his Friends have no Reason to be asham'd, either of his Capacity or Courage. The rest of this Gentleman's Arguments for the continuance of the Forces, run upon a Supposition of Dissaffection in the People, whose Inclinations, he says, appear upon every popular Commotion. I have already answered those Pretences of Disaffection, and therefore shall not trouble the Reader with a Repetition of these Answers. Upon the whole, I think I may affirm, that weaker Arguments were never offer'd in the defence of any Cause; for this, perhaps, the Subject may plead an Excuse; but I think, nothing can be said in Vindication of this Treatment of those whose Arguments he pretended (but was unable) to answer. His manner of accusing, is to me unintelligible. He has twice with great Bravery affirm'd, that the *True Briton* is a Coward. The *True Briton*, I think, was a Character which the Authors of those Papers propos'd to maintain. How therefore the *True Briton*

cou'd be call'd a Coward, I am at a Loſs to find, neither do I think, that by that Character any particular Perſon could think himſelf denominated, for ſeveral Gentlemen had a Share in theſe Papers, who are altogether unknown to him: Such a Method of reviling as this, ſhews the greateſt Malice, Ignorance, and even Want of Courage, and cannot fail of reflecting upon the Author of it, that Diſhonour which he intended to throw upon others.

FINIS.

APR